Lee, Lee and Lee [App. Math. and Comp. Vol. 159 , 2004, pp. 317-331] recently presented a collection of n + 1 different n-party key agreement protocols based on multi-linear forms. Here we show that n − 2 of the protocols are completely insecure, being vulnerable to impersonation attacks.
Introduction
Recently, Lee, Lee and Lee [4] presented a collection of n+1 different n-party key agreement protocols. Their protocols make use of multi-linear forms [3] and are based on the protocols developed by Al-Riyami and Paterson in [1, 2] . We show that, contrary to the claim of [4, p. 323] , n − 2 of the n + 1 protocols are easily broken using an impersonation attack. In our attack, the adversary impersonates the parties in the protocol to one another and learns the session keys held by the parties at the end of the attack. Thus the protocols of [4] do not meet even the most basic security requirement for a key agreement protocol.
In Section 2 we review the protocols of [4] , while in Section 3 we present our attacks on the protocols of [4] .
The protocols of Lee, Lee and Lee
The protocols of [4] operate in the following mathematical setting. Groups G 1 and G 2 are of the same prime order (p say) and e n : G n−1 1 → G 2 is an (n − 1)-multi-linear map, that is, a map satisfying:
for any a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n−1 ∈ Z p and any x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n−1 ∈ G 1 . Such maps were introduced to cryptography by Boneh and Silverberg in [3] . However, it should be noted that no implementations of such maps suitable for use in cryptographic applications are currently known to exist.
In the protocols of [4] , each of the n participants A i has a long-term private key x i ∈ Z p and a corresponding public key g x i where g is a fixed generator of G 1 . Each participant then picks at random a i ∈ Z * p , computes g a i and broadcasts this value to all the other participants. Then n + 1 possible different methods for the protocol participants to agree on a common key are presented in [4] . Of these, two methods, namely MAK-A and MAK-C, need not concern us further here. The remaining methods are named MAK B-j (1 ≤ j ≤ n − 1) in [4] . In method MAK B-j, the key computed by the participants is of the form:
where [n] denotes the set {1, 2, . . . , n}, x I denotes the product i∈I x i and a [n]\I denotes the product i∈[n]\I a i . We note that a different (and arguably less clear) notation is used to describe these protocols in [4] . Thus the set of exponents appearing in the calculation of K consists of all n j possible expressions comprising a product of j distinct terms of the form x i (which we call "x" terms) and n − j distinct terms of the form a i (which we call "a" terms 
Impersonation attack
We now demonstrate an impersonation attack on the protocols MAK B-j for 1 ≤ j ≤ n − 2, that is, on all the MAK B protocols of [4] with the exception of MAK B-(n − 1). Let j satisfy 1 ≤ j ≤ n − 2 and consider an adversary E who intercepts and replaces the values broadcast by the participants in protocol MAK B-j. For each k, adversary E intercepts the value g a k sent by participant k to the other protocol participants and replaces it with a value g a k , where a k ∈ Z p is known to E.
Consider how participant A k in receipt of values g a 1 , g a 2 , . . . g a n (excluding the term g a k ) calculates his key, K k say. This key is a computed by A k as a product of terms of the form T I = e n−1 (g, g, . . . , g) x I a [n]\I where I is a subset of [n] of size j and the a i are replaced by a i for each i = k.
We show how E can also compute each of these terms T I . Let I = {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i j }. There are two cases. In the first case, we have k ∈ I. Then E knows all of the "a" terms appearing in the exponent of T I (they are all of the form a i ) and can exploit the multi-linearity of e n−1 to compute:
In the second case, we have k / ∈ I. Then E knows all of the "a" terms appearing in the exponent of T I with the exception of a k and so can compute:
where
Here, we use the fact that j ≤ n − 2 to ensure that the j + 1 different terms x i 1 , x i 2 , . . . , x i j , a k can be moved from the exponent to "inside" the map e n−1 . Thus it is apparent that E can also compute all the terms T I , and hence the key K k held by participant k. Note that at the end of the attack, the various participants hold different keys, all of which are known to the adversary E. This is normal in impersonation attacks. If the keys are subsequently used, for example, for encryption, then this allows E to act as a man-in-the-middle, intercepting, decrypting, reading and then re-encrypting any data sent by any participant to any other participant.
